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ABSTRACT: This paper considers a central objection to evolutionary epistemology. The 
bject.ion is thnt bi<ilogicij l and epistemic dt-vd op niellt are not 1m,1I goui.;. i;ince while 
~iologk·.il ,iritition is blind. ~pis:temf.c v~ ria tio.11 i~ !'IOL. ·1 1e • em~r tio11 f hypoth~es. 
unl rl.c the •ene.ration of genotyp , i n I random. W argw Hro t lh" obj«:tion is 
m~gucded and ~hotv bm the cc'Illl'lll analogy of c\•ol1.1 1ioaary epi'.1.lcmology can he: pre-
~rvet . The core of our reply i~ lhat m1,1ctl epir;t meet vari@U n ' irt<lcecd dlrecled y 
lleul'iotLic:,;, but L11esc llemi sl 'CS are analogo u.~ ~ biol og;i el pret1daptatit ns which a :ecoun 1 
for Hu: cvo!uti n or 1."0mp!ex o l)~an -, We 11l.w a.rgu IJuU many of thr:se heu m tiefi 01· 
MCJ>is1emlc prcadaptatiou~" arc no1 innate but wl:'rt 1hcm e!YC'S generated ll proce-s.1. t1f 
blind varialiQn and s,ele<:live rc1en1ion. 
KEY WORDS: Evolutionary epistemology, heuristics, preadaptation, variation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Evolutionary epistemology is an approach to the theory of knowledge that 
is based on an analogy between epistemic development and biological 
evolution. Beyond this, however, the phrase "evolutionary epistemology" 
has been used by many people to mean a variety of things. One common 
Interpretation f lhe plu f<e i Uutt an evoluri nary epi temuk>gy prnvid · 
a biological accou.tH of beli f.. Thi is not the t pe of evoluti nar-y 
ep· ·temol gy with which we will be concern -cl here .. ln. t ad, we wil l ocus 
on th· 1t of e olurio nary .epislern logy popul ri.zoo -,y Donald · am.pbell, 
an ev ILUi nary epi, l mology which ha,, as il ''centra in ig.ht . . , lha:t 
biological natura l· elect' n, r .~ome other 1 ·imilarl se lection proccs · 
involving the real w r id edit and . elects amon variation p oviding the 
1t belw en b lief or knowledg amd the real world" ( ampbell 1977, p. 
Biology and Philosophy 4 ( 1989) 33- 56. 
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JO· . mpbeU 1974a). For ampbell. evolutiona.ry biology does not it el 
provide a cumprehen ivc theor >f knowledge but ii p ovides. a model for 
such a theory.' H begin h.i ' approach to olmionary epi. temology by 
lookfn11 l three ex mple of I.he pr blem of fit: biolo i , I evolution , vi uaJ 
p rceplion 11d lh d v,fopment o · sci nt i, knowledge, How can w 
exp! in the fit b tween organism and euvironmenc? How can w e ·plain 
the fit between ur visual perceplion of th t! world and th way Lhe world 
i ·? Ho can w explain the fit b ·1ween ci · Mi 1c th orie. an the world 
they describe? According to Campbell, all three problems have the same 
solution: trial and error, natural selection, or, more specifically, blind 
variation and selective retention. All three "marvelous" fits can be best 
explained by natural selection. 
The three major components of the model of natural selection are 
variation, selection and retention. In the modern Darwinian theory of 
biological evolution, genetic mutations provide the variations, the environ-
ment provides the selection, and reproduction provides the retention. The 
variations are not pre-designed. Rather, fit is achieved only through the 
hindsight of the selection process. In biological evolution, this amounts to 
saying that the mechanism of variation is not influenced by the effects the 
variations would have. The likelihood of a mutation is not correlated with 
the benefits or liabilities that mutation would confer on the organism. 
Rather, those organisms with features which make them less fit for survival 
do not :t1rv:ive in comp tition wi1h othe organi ms in tn en ironm nt 
'I hich h ve featur , that are more fit. Ev lutionary epis.temology Ucmpt 
to appl lhi • blind ariation and · le t ive rc t •nlion mod 11 1 th groWlh of 
. cicnlific knowhlge and lo human th ught pr es~• · in general. In his 
es y, we will talk primadl bout . cicntific knowled but what w say 
will als apply to gener I nowtedgc. We fo us on cientific knowledge 
because, in scie:nce, the separation bctwet.m variatfon and selection is 
clearer, and we want to focus our discussion only on variation and not 
selection. 
1n lhi: es ay, we will di cu s just one o the major cliaU ng fa ing 
i.:volutionary epi ·temology - how to , xplain Inc appare-nt guidedn ss of 
the varit1tion thal i ld hypothese lhal re candid.ates f< r testing. inc 
ev lutionary pistemolo y attempt tn e tabli h a r lation betwe n bi logi-
cal and ,epistcmjc evolu1iot1, an imm diate diffi ult i • that biological 
evoluLion :eems lo involv blind variation · hile epi lemi ,,,, lution se m!t 
to iuvolvi; guided variation. G nelic change i, riot influenced by the needs 
of th org ni. 111, but the pr duction o new hypotheses by a . dentist 
eem. )bviou.sly infl u.enc d b}r 1..bc problem she i trying lo solve. lf the 
volutionary epi ·temologi 1 i • going to Hrgue. fo a strong analog b lween 
biol gical and pi~temic e olution he must provide either an account of 
ho epi. I mic var:iali ns eem guided but are in fac:1 bJind, ran ac,eount 
o how biolo •ical variations ,-;e m blind bu1 ar in facl guided. We will do 
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both, primarily arguing that epistemic variation is blinder than it seems, 
but also arguing that biological variation is more guided than it seems. We 
will explore two accounts of epistemic variation: the appeal to hidden 
chaos, which says that variations seem guided only because their underlying 
randomness is supressed, and the appeal to epistemic preadaptation, 
which says that the variations are guided, in that they are restricted by 
heuristics, but that these heuristics are themselves retained from a process 
that was mostly random. In other words, guided variation comes from 
retention - the retention of heuristics which are produced by previous 
variations. We will argue that not only do these two accounts work 
together to characterize the actual blindness and the seeming guidedness 
of epistemic variations, but, further, that they are analogous to biological 
mutation and biological preadaptation. H{dden chaos is the epistemic cor-
relate of biological mutation and epistemic preadaptation is the epistemic 
correlate of biological preadaptation. Just as biological mutations and 
biological preadaptations combine to explain biological variations, hidden 
chaos and epistemic preadaptation combine to explain epistemic variations. 
Our discussion will proceed in the following manner. First, we will 
discuss variation in biology. We will note that biological evolution involves 
both strictly random variation and variation guided by preadaptation.2 We 
will then discuss the parallels in epistemic variation: hidden chaos and 
epistemic preadaptation. In our discussion of epistemic preadaptation, we 
will consider the problem of innate heuristics - if we have certain 
biologically innate restrictions on our epistemic variation, evolutionary 
epistemology may be false. We will argue that such innate heuristics do in 
fact exist, that they are consistent with evolutionary epistemology, and that 
they do not occur in large enough numbers to trivialize evolutionary 
epistemology. We will conclude with a discussion of some objections to 
this view of epistemic variation. 
II. BIOLOGICAL VARIATION 
The details of biological variation help to explain the seeming guidedness 
of epistemic variation. Before Darwin's theory of natural selection was 
proposed, many people supposed that the amazing fit between organism 
and environment was due to the work of an intelligent creator. The 
argument from design used complex natural structures as evidence for the 
existence of a supernatural creator of the universe. The argument usually 
took the form of an analogy. Suppose you were walking along the beach 
and came upon a watch; after studying the watch, you noted its precise 
design, a design which could have only come to be if this watch were 
designed to work in a certain way. You would reason that this watch was 
created by somebody who intended it to fulfill a certain function, that of 
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keeping time. he argument from design (:ompares th watch l the 
human eye. The eye like th watch; i a preci e complex in. trumenl 1hat 
perform. a particular r\lnction with great accuracy and dependability. How 
could the yo be as it is unles lt wa designe by an intelligent ere lor? 
Darwin course·, had an an wer: he tgued I.hat the process o evolution 
through flaturnl .elect.ion, a pr ces with no inten1ionaJ or inteUigentt 
rcalor behind i . could pro .uce an ye. Blind variation and selectiv.e 
retention is a mechanism that can do God's work. The claim that the 
amazing fit between organism and environment is due to concealed 
random processes is central to biology and to the analogy that evolu-
tionary epistemology exploits. 
Daniel Dennett provides a useful thought experiment which shows how 
fit can result from unseen randomness: 
bi lhou£}11 experiment is im,p1red hy one of the mosl elegant ~nd instdiou~ of Ltie 
clas ic coil games; it probabty al.ready has a na.m,c:, but 1101 Jmowlrig i11 I. caJl it 1he 
lolllifl.\l p 1ramiq, You obtain ;i mailing Ii t f eriou~ JY1mbl r , dJvidc: ii in hoJI; and 
send one nalf 1hc prediction thal l:cam A wW win lhe champion hip nex1 1 ,eek, an.J he 
olhcr half 111e prc:J[otio.n thal te.1m A wm lose, A week hllc:r, half y ur mailing list Im. 
rccc:ivcd a true prediction from you - free of charge. Dls~-urd the other h~ lf o[ the 
mailing Ii~ diYid:c: lite remaindc:r in ialf again, and send 111 n a ~1.v1:1d brace o[ 
complcmcn tary p:redlcUori ·; lhis culs down )'O!t:i r pool , r ucken but now tht..-y h11va I wo 
'proof." of your c.laif\'())'rulCe. After <I (c:w more "·ucccsses n yoo announce lha1 the: free 
!rial perilid is over; for)' ur nex:t predlc1ion tile)' will h.a,re co pay. (Dennett 19!14, p. 93 
footnote:) 
The same sort of phenomenon occurs in biological evolution: since we 
only see those organisms which survive, we are like one of Dennett's 
"suckers". Because a sucker does not know about all the wrong predic-
tions which are sent out, he thinks the con man knows in advance which 
team wil1 win. Similarly, we think that evolution i ·. purposeful, bul it is not 
- n lure is only gu sing. Only when he looks at the larger pictun: can a 
sucker. that b 1s being conned; nly when we look al th larger piclur 
c ,fl. we see l1:ow ra dom variati n is producing organi 'm which are fit. 
Just a·, the pyramid lheory d fu es the argument th l the con-man mu"t 
know h wilJ win ·inc h made a ·tring of C<Jrrect predic1io11s Darwin 
theo-ry defu. the argument from de ign. Th rh,cory of natural ~ lection 
defu the inference from design to d igner nor just hecaus it provide 
an altern tive e-xplanation of desigu and so . how · thal the infore.nce to a 
supernatural designer is not obligatory, but also because Darwin's theory 
is more plausible than the argument from design. Darwin's theory does not 
require positing things for which we have no good evidence. The argument 
from design involves a being of unimaginable powers, while the theory of 
natural selection involves forces that we observe today, forces that are 
easily explained. 
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In addition to the virtue of greater plausibility that comes from 
appealing to more mundane entities and processes, Darwin's theory is 
more plausible because it is more explanatory than the appeal to God. The 
appeal to God has an explanatory weakness shared by all straightforward 
intentional explanations: the pattern to be explained is used in the 
explanation as an intentional object. This does not make such explanations 
worthlessly circular, but it does make them fairly superficial. The design in 
nature is explained by appealing to that same design in God's mind. By 
contrast, as Robert Nozick has observed, explanations like Darwin's go 
deeper, because they can account for a pattern without appealing to that 
pattern itself in any form (Nozick 1974, p. 18-19). 
The theory of natural selection does, however, face various anomalies. 
One of these, which will be of special importance to our discussion of 
evolutionary epistemology, is the problem of complex organs. It is virtually 
impossible for a single mutation to occur that would produce a complex 
organ such as a wing, since many different genes are involved. The 
probability that the necessary number of mutations would occur simul-
taneously, in a coordinated fashion, is infinitely small. So it appears that 
the natural selection model cannot account for the evolutionary develop-
ment of these organs. 
This anomaly can be resolved by what biologists call 'preadaptation.' 3 
In answer to the question "How do we get a complex structure like a 
wing?", biologists say that there are simpler intermediate structures which 
occurred before the wing. But this does not seem to solve the problem, 
unless these intermediate structures themselves have some adaptive 
advantage. If the intermediary structure had no adaptive function, then it 
would generally tend not to be retained and so could not lead to a wing. 
Obviously, the half-wing could not enable its possessor to fly (otherwise, it 
would be considered a wing). There nm. t b an adaptive advao1, ge of a 
pre-winged bird having a half-wing structure. The biologist's answer is to 
give an account of the half-wing's preadaptive function. For example, the 
half-wing may have been used for trapping insects. For biologists, the 
move to preadaptation allows them to explain how a complex organ may 
have evolved; it does so by claiming that the structure evolved from an 
"ancestor" of the organ which may have had a different function. 
In summary, biological variation primarily involves two sorts of expla-
nations for how features of organisms come into being: regular random 
mutations and preadaptations. Note that neither explanation alone will 
suffice. Random mutations without biological preadaptation do not provide 
a good explanation for complex organs since the chances of mutations 
alone producing complex organisms are infinitesimally small. Biological 
preadaptation without random mutations is no different from the argument 
from design - without random mutations behind them, the preadaptations 
themselves would be inexplicable. 
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III. EPISTEMIC VARIATION 
Like fl] biologic I inspiration, i:volutioriary epistemology faces various 
anomalie . P rhap Lhe most cons icuous is tha t pisll.lntic va ation - the 
prod uction f new hypolh - seem· _anything but random. If cientific 
conjectur · we.r rea ll y random, it would be a miracle that Lh astronomer 
who ~enerate n ·~ onj~clur,e usu, lly manages 10 produce a ca.odidat 
hypoLhe. i · about teroid ' ralh r than about steroid . And, of coul'se, the 
ielltisL doe much t lter than mer ly g uio the field light: lh variation 
in science appears tiglltry guided. Thi.q ' eems a dramati isanalogy t t.h 
blin n · of biological variation, lhus c lling volut:ionary epi temology 
irHo que Llon. Our vi w is lhd the claimed Ii ·analogy does no exist. he 
appearance to l e conlrnry r t • in part n tn overly imple picture of 
iological volution, a picture which do not t Ice .into account the 
coormou. role of biological preaclaptalion. \ •e will argue that evolutionary 
epistemology can account for the apparent guidedness of variation, and 
that the central mechanism of that explanation is itself analogous to the 
mechanism of biological preadaptation that saved Darwin's theory from 
the anomaly of complex organs. · 
The remainder f this paper. ;vhich contains our e plan • lion for the 
apparent guidednes of epis temic va · tion,, fall. into :live parts. Fi ·t. we 
consider th · e>.tent t which thi guidedn s i · only pparenl: the variation 
i in ad blind or chaolic but.. for various rea ons the chao i hidden . 
. econd, we bow .huw the uidednes that actually exi t - can accounted 
for by appea l epi temic prcadapt tions in Lh form of heuri, tic and we 
discus, ome of !he form - these h:euri li · take. hird , we consid r the 
m~hani in by which these heuristi - themselve we e g nerated. We will 
argue lhal most of them are based n h.id n chao ·, (i.e., that 1hese 
heuristic. have been retained from ea Ji r blind variation) but s-ome may 
be innate , an. l we will consider how an evolUlfonary episl mology ought to 
1reat this innate componcnl. Fourth , we will evaJuate the . lrength of the 
analogy be tween biol gical and epistemic preadaptation by givino a 
positi c account of it. Fi ,1Uy, we will consider om objections to th,e 
analogy bclw en biological and epi. l mic variation. 
Our first r ponse lo the see.ming gu"dednes. of epjst~rnic evolution i. 
L laim hat iL i , like the seeming guided ess of bi.ological evolution, only 
appasent: both can be e p.lai ed by unseen randomness of Lhe sort 
exemplified in lhe louting pyramid . Th analogy is ru follow . . Before 
Darwin, the common intufl ion wa that the amazing fil bet v . n species 
and lhe environmenL i • the re:ull of a guided intem.g nt p:roc · -~ after 
Darwin, pecies are een to be the r ult o rand m variation coupled with 
election and retention. imilarly in the case of epistemic evolution, 
before ev luti nary epistemol~gy. th common intuition. was tha:t idea. 
and . cicntifi discoveries are tbe resnlt · guided in elligeo1 proces 
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after evolutionary epistemology, they are seen to be the result of random 
variation.4 The first response thus involves a straightforward appeal to 
hidden chaos - the variation is blind but the blindness is hidden. ln the 
touting pyramid, the chaos is hidden because the suckers do not receive 
any of the wrong predictions - they do not yet see that the con man is not 
clairvoyant. In biological evolution, the chaos is hidden because we do not 
see all of the mutations (many of them fatal) that took place hundreds or 
thousands of years ago. In epistemic evolution, according to the appeal to 
hidden chaos, the chaos is hidden for a variety of reasons.5 Here we will 
only sketch some of the ways that it could possibly be hidden. 
In order to see three of the ways that the randomness could be hidden, 
we will consider the hypothetical case of a scientist who has developed a 
theory T about the world. If we watch this scientist, we will think that she 
came to believe in T by an intelligently guided process. This, however, may 
only be an illusion. First, there may have been some unconscious variation 
going on in her mind. She may have unconsciously thought of many 
different theories, but only one enters her consciousness. Second, she 
might have consciously considered many alternative theories before she 
settled on T, but forgotten these pondered alternatives. The chaotic 
speculation would be hidden from her because she only remembers 
thinking about T. Third, it might be that she came upon T as a result of an 
accident or a lucky guess, but that afterwards she, for the sake of her 
peers, made up justifications for it, thereby hiding the fact that T was 
randomly derived. The random roots of T would thus be hidden behind 
her post hoc explanations. These are just three of the different ways that 
the randomness of variation might be hidden to the observer. Like 
Dennett's touting pyramid, they provide accounts of what is happening 
behind the scenes that makes a random process seem guided; as with 
Dennett's con man, the scientist's bad guesses may be supressed. 
But these simple appeals to hidden chaos are not enough. Earlier we 
discussed the anomaly of complex organs that occurs on the simple 
account of biological evolution - it is highly implausible that a single set 
of simultaneous mutations should produce such complex structures. A 
similar anomaly occurs in evolutionary epistemology. It is implausible that 
a single instance of hidden chaos could produce such a complex hypothe-
sis as a detailed scientific theory. It seems wild to suppose that Kepler 
generated his laws through simple hidden chaos. Just as random mutations 
alone do not explain complex organs, hidden chaos alone does not explain 
our complex beliefs. Inspired by the biologist, the evolutionary epistemol-
ogist resolves this anomaly with an appeal to epistemic preadaptation. 
Epistemic preadaptations may act to guide the variation that yields 
hypotheses. Like the half-wing of biological preadaptation, the epistemic 
preadaptation had to be good for things other than its current adaptive use 
(or, at least, not harmful), otherwise, it would not have been adopted in 
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the first place. Just as the half-wing was a pre-wing structure which was 
good for something other than flight, so the epistemic preadaptation is 
good for something other than what the hypothesis it precedes is good for. 
The epistemic variation that preadaptation is supposed to explain 
concerns the production of candidate hypotheses for testing. When these 
hypotheses are not generated randomly, we can call whatever guides or 
restricts their production a heuristic. Of course not all heuristics govern 
the production of hypotheses: we rely on them in most of our other 
epistemic activities as well. For example, we have heuristics that guide us 
in the testing of hypotheses and others that guide us in the acquisition of 
new hypotheses that require no testing since they have been deduced from 
previous hypotheses. But the heuristics that concern us in this essay are 
just those that guide us in acquiring hypotheses that we will then go on to 
test, since they are the ones whose existence seems to call the analogy to 
biological variation into question. In science, these are the heuristics that 
operate in the "context of discovery", where conjectures are found , as 
opposed to the "context of justification", where they are tested. Accord-
ingly, we call these heuristics "discovery heuristics". The two major 
questions about discovery heuristics concern their nature and their source. 
We will discuss these in turn. 
As a hypothetical example, consider a chemist who is trying to discover 
why a particular compound behaves in a particular way. In her search, she 
would not make a random conjecture and start to refute it, as might be 
predicted by an evolutionary epistemology relying only on the appeal to 
hidden chaos. Rather, she would draw on a panoply of heuristics which 
she has developed in part from her previous chemical experience. Perhaps 
she would consider explanations for the behavior of other similar com-
pound , dr wing her conj,ecture from the.~e. In d ing s , she L making 
certain assumptions: she is assuming that the other compound is in fact 
similar, she is assuming induction (namely, that past experiences with this 
and similar compounds will be repeated in the future), etc. 
Given our broad notion of a heuristic as anything that restricts varia-
tion, there should be many specific types of discovery heuristics. In this 
essay we can only briefly discuss three: abstract rules, concrete rules, and 
exemplars. Abstract rules are discovery heuristics that apply to many areas 
of inquiry. Some of these rules are explicit, in the sense that they are ones 
a scientist could be expected to volunteer or at least to acknowledge as 
her own as soon as they are presented. The actual content of particular 
discovery heuristics is not important to our argument, but perhaps some 
examples are that hypotheses should be potential solutions to the problem 
at hand, that they should be tractable with the tools of the discipline, and 
that they should be testable. These explicit rules may seem vague or vapid, 
but they are clearly highly restrictive as compared to strictly random 
variation. There are presumably also many general rules with more 
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articulated and restricting content, but most of these must be implicit or 
tacit, since scientists do not volunteer them, psychologists have not 
discovered them, and philosophers cannot agree about them. For example, 
there are presumably various abstract features of a hypothesis that give it 
the sort of simplicity and coherence that help to make it a promising 
conjecture, and the scientist may be supposed to have tacit rules that guide 
him to produce conjectures with these features. 
Unlike abstract rules, concrete rules are field-specific discovery heu-
ristics. They tell scientists to favor conjectures that bear certain relation-
ships to other theoretical claims in the discipline. Many concrete rules can 
be seen as rules for modifying old hypotheses to produce new ones. When 
a previously established hypothesis is judged to be unacceptable, it is 
rarely rejected without a trace. Typically, the old hypothesis provides a 
strong constraint on the form that its replacement will take. In the simplest 
case, the rule would be that the new hypothesis should be as similar to the 
old one as the data will allow. The same sort of rule often appears to be 
applied in larger scale theory change: the new theory should not only 
entail the old data, it should also entail an approximation of the old 
theory.6 To make the contrast with abstract rules more vivid, we may say 
that it is the old hypothesis itself that provides the concrete rule which acts 
to restrict variation, though the scientist can only be expected to have tacit 
knowledge of the many ways the old hypothesis constrains the new one. 
The last type of discovery heuristic we will discuss has been emphasized 
by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1970, passim, especially the postscript). A 
scientist uses a canonical solution in her field as a concrete model for new 
solutions. This exemplar focuses the scientist's attention on new putative 
solutions that she perceives as similar to the exemplar. The similarity 
relations the exemplar creates sharply restrict the variation the scientist 
undergoes in solving her problem. Indeed, if Kuhn is right, they also 
determine what problems she will attempt to solve.7 Unlike abstract rules, 
exemplars are highly field-specific; unlike concrete rules, exemplars are 
particular solutions that remain entirely acceptable rather than general 
hypotheses or theories that usually need to be modified. Like the two 
other types of discovery heuristics, exemplars partially account for the 
directed character of epistemic variation. 
Having given a sketch of the nature of some discovery heuristics, we 
turn now to their source. Although these heuristics help to explain why 
epistemic variation is restricted, heuristics alone cannot provide a com-
plete explanation. Just as biological mutations and biological preadapta-
tions must work together to explain away the seeming guidedness of 
biological variation, hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation must work 
together to explain away the seeming guidedness of epistemic variation. In 
biology, the half-wing appeared as a result of a random genetic mutation. 
Similarly, a non-innate preadapted heuristic must be the result of hidden 
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chaos, otherwise it seems that evolutionary epistemology will not work. 
Epistemic preadaptation thus involves admitting that not every conjecture 
is completely unguided; some are guided by preadapted heuristics, 
generalized rules of thumb developed from past experiences. The non-
randomness of some acts and some scientific discoveries is attributed to 
heuristics which are themselves retained from previous blind variation and 
selective retention and can be considered "already achieved wisdom of 
some general sort" (Campbell 197 4a, p. 422). Thus we must distinguish 
the question of the source of our hypotheses from the question of the 
source of the heuristics that help to generate them. Because of heuristics, 
the generation of a hypothesis may not be random or blind; but this leaves 
open the possibility that some of the heuristics come from blind variation. 
As a hypothetical example, consider a scientist who makes a conjecture 
C guided by a certain heuristic H 1• Where did this scientist come up with 
H 1? Evolutionary epistemology says that H 1, if not innate, must be the 
result of a blind variation and selective retention process. However, there 
remain two possibilities: H 1 might have been actually blindly selected, or 
H 1 might have been selected on the basis of another heuristic H 2 (a meta-
heuristic). The same is true with H 2 - there can be a nested hierarchy of 
heuristics - and there seems to be a possibility of an infinite regress, a 
regress which must come to an end if evolutionary epistemology is going 
to work. The regress can be prevented if the appeal to epistemic pre-
adaptation is qualified; the qualification is that, ultimately, behind every 
instance of preadaptation not based on an innate heuristic, there is a case 
of hidden chaos. In other words, each non-innate conjecture, though it 
may be based on many levels of heuristics, must ultimately be based on a 
blind guess. Thus, we see that the two responses to the challenge against 
the blindness claim (hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation) come 
together. A seemingly guided discovery is attributed to blind variation in 
one of two ways: either the discovery is viewed as a result of hidden chaos, 
or as a result of guided processes based on heuristics retained from 
previous variation, ultimately stemming from hidden chaos. 
In the last two paragraphs, we have qualified evolutionary epistemology 
by restricting our discussion to non-innate heuristics; we leave open the 
possibility of there being innate heuristics. If, however, there are certain 
heuristics that are innate, then it looks as though evolutionary epistemology 
is false, since there would then be heuristics that do not have their source 
in blind variation. For example, if Noam Chomsky is right in claiming that 
we have an innate capacity to learn a certain type of language, then the 
acquisition of language would be based on a set of innate heuristics, 
principles genetically programmed into all humans. Similarly, it may be 
that some heuristics that govern scientific practice, such as some sort of 
inductive heuristic, are innate. Many evolutionary epistemologists have 
been tempted to respond to this problem with an appeal to blind variation 
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and selective retention at the biological level. They argue that epistemic 
variation can still be blind even when preadaptation traces back to an 
innate trait in humans if the innate trait can be attributed to the blind 
variation of biological evolution. As an example, let us consider an 
imaginary dialogue between an evolutionary epistemologist (EE) and one 
who is skeptical of evolutionary epistemology (SK). 
EE: Knowledge processes and the growth of science are instances of 
blind variation and selective retention. 
SK: But when I put words together to make sentences, there is no blind 
groping going on. In order to make myself understood, I form 
sentences without any blind variation. 
EE: That is because you have developed, through a process that I call 
epistemic preadaptation, heuristics for communicating, for forming 
sentences. These preadapted heuristics were arrived at through a trial 
and error process. At first, you tried to communicate without a 
regular grammar, but you found that no one did what you ':"anted 
them to do. Through trial and error you found that if you asked for 
something in a certain way, you were more likely to get it. So, while 
you do not go through the trial and error process each time you 
speak, you do use techniques (heuristics) which you acquired 
through blind variation and selective retention. 
SK: But what if the ability to use and acquire language is innate in 
humans? If this is the case, then there is no trial and error in the 
ability to acquire and use language. A set of innate principles of 
language is genetically programmed or "hard-wired" into humans. 
EE: But this ability became hard-wired in humans through genetic evolu-
tion. The innate ability to acquire language, if there is such an ability 
in humans, came to be innate through genetic mutation and natural 
selection. 
This line of thought seems to save evolutionary epistemology because 
biological evolution brings in the blind variation and selective retention 
that is needed to save the analogy. However, we think that this appeal to 
the blindness of biological variation creates a disanalogy between biologi-
cal and epistemic evolution and makes evolutionary epistemology trivial. 
First, this appeal creates a disanalogy between epistemic and biological 
evolution. It pictures biological evolution as blind on its own level, while 
epistemic evolution is not blind in its own terms, but only blind by proxy, 
because it rests on the truly blind biology. By using biology both as an 
analogy and as a partial direct explanation, the strength of the analogy 
is weakened. Second, this appeal reduces the claim of evolutionary 
epistemology simply to the claim of the truth of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory. For if the appeal to biological variation is a legitimate one, then 
regardless of what occurs at the epistemic level, if biological evolution is 
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blind, then so is epistemic evolution. Consider, for example, the possible 
world in which biological evolution is true, but all our beliefs 8 (that is, all 
the beliefs that we will ever have) are innate. In this possible world, all of 
our thoughts are guided (in fact, they are preprogrammed), while all 
biological evolution is blind, non-guided, etc. The appeal to the blind 
variation of biological evolution can still be made; the only difference 
would be that all the beliefs of these completely guided beings are like the 
innate capacity for language which we are claimed to have. In other words, 
if the appeal to biological variation is a legitimate way of saving the blind 
variation claim of evolutionary epistemology, then none of the other 
claims of the theory is needed; hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation 
need not be true for evolutionary epistemology to be true. We do not, 
however, want to count an epistemology. as evolutionary if its only source 
of blindness is biological variation. There are two versions of evolutionary 
epistemology involved here. The one we are defending claims that epis-
temic evolution is analogous to biological evolution. This is a strong and 
interesting claim, particularly if the analogy is spelled out, as we are here 
attempting to do, at least partially. The second version, the version on 
which the appeal to biological variation is based, claims that epistemic 
evolution comes from biological evolution. In the sense that this claim is 
normally understood, it is epistemically empty: it amounts only to the 
biological claim that we are a product of natural selection. Therefore, the 
appeal to biological variation is not a legitmate way to save evolutionary 
epistemology from attacks against the blindness claim because it trivializes 
evolutionary epistemology. 
We are not disturbed by the trivializing result of the appeal to biological 
variation because we think that this move is not necessary to preserve the 
analogy between biological and epistemic evolution and to handle the 
objection that some heuristics may be innate. In fact, the distinction 
between innate and acquired beliefs is, we think, the saving grace of 
evolutionary epistemology. To begin with, evolutionary epistemology has 
no responsibility to explain genetic traits of organisms. Evolutionary 
epistemology just involves the claim that beliefs evolve in the same way 
that biological species do; innate heuristics need not be explained by 
evolutionary epistemology. It is perfectly consistent for an evolutionary 
epistemology to leave the explanation of such innate heuristics to biology; 
evolutionary epistemology only has to explain those heuristics which are 
acquired. Further, evolutionary epistemology need not deny that acquired 
beliefs are often partially rooted in innate heuristics - this does not mean 
that epistemic variation is not predominantly blind. The upshot of this is 
that heuristics can have a "mixed parentage"; they can be based on blind" 
epistemic variation as well as genetically innate heuristics. 
What does this clarification of evolutionary epistemology say about 
epistemic preadaptation? Recall that the appeal to epistemic preadapta-
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tion was made in order to save the claim that epistemic variation is blind. 
On the clarified view, this move is still necessary and legitimate. The 
appeal to biological variation was made in order to save the claim that 
epistemic variation is blind even in light of innate beliefs. On the clarified 
view, this move is not necessary, because it is no curse or surprise that 
some heuristics and hypotheses are linked to innate characteristics; the 
acquired component of epistemic variation can still be seen as blind. 
Chomsky's account of language provides a good example of mixed 
parentage. The universal grammar provides the elements and principles 
that are common to all possible human languages. Chomsky (1986) 
distinguishes between an internalized language (I-language) and a target 
language. A target language is the language actually spoken while an 
I-language is some element in the mind of a user of a language. Chomsky 
has switched the search for the universal grammar from the target 
language to the I-language. He interprets universal grammar "as the theory 
of human I-languages, a system of conditions deriving from the human 
biological endowment that identifies the I-languages that are humanly 
accessible under normal conditions" (Chomsky 1986, p. 23). The universal 
grammar is "a characterization of these innate, biologically determined 
principles, which constitute one component of the human mind - the 
language faculty" (Chomsky 1986, p. 24). In our terms, the universal 
grammar, the innate capacity for language, is an example of a set of innate 
heuristics. The universal grammar restricts epistemic variation - certain 
"languages" are not humanly possible because of this restriction. The set of 
innate heuristics plus non-innate heuristics, acquired rules of language, 
together produce the actual language that we speak, our target language. 
The I-language isolates the innate component of language, but acquiring 
an target language requires setting particular parameters within the con-
straints of the I-language. Since the innate component does not determine 
the target language, it remains open to the evolutionary epistemologist to 
claim that the particular target language comes from selection from among 
those target languages which are compatible with the I-language. The 
example of universal grammar thus provides an excellent example of 
the innate heuristics and the "mixed parentage" of certain epistemic 
entities. 
Our view, then, is that discovery heuristics may be either innate or 
randomly generated and, if innate, the evolutionary epistemologist ( qua 
EET-type evolutionary epistemologist) has nothing to say about them. 
This avoids the trivialization of evolutionary epistemology, but it may 
create a new problem. We do not want to purchase the benefit of 
falsifiability at the cost of falsification. If all heuristics are innate, this 
would seem to refute our version of evolutionary epistemology, or at least 
make it vacuous. One reply would be to argue that even if all heuristics are 
innate, there is still a mixed parentage that allows for evolutionary 
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~pi tecnoiogy since the heuristic: only detemuoe th .· ange within which 
conjectur · wilJ falJ and variali n within th.al range is random.9 t ler an, 
different scicnti make di feren t c nje.cture . Thi repl wouJd ive 
volu :ioaary epistemology om role, but il would be d~appoiming as the « 
ole r p n ince it would fail lo meet the objection that epistemic 
variation is disanaJogous to biological variation, lhe ob.e<:t'on that m ti-
vates tJ1i. e ·say. Of cou.rse,. this is primarily an empirical quesli, n: what 
percentage o ur heuristic. are innate? If all u hcuri tics are in.oat , 
then evolutionary episte-moJogy (al least the EET-type which we are 
doing)~ ould be falsrfied. rn fortunately, a slronge reply i · po. ibJe: n tall 
ou heuristic~ are innate· many of them r t n hidden ch . ·. Below, we 
present some considerations that suggest that most of our heuristics are 
not innate.11 
One argument for acquired heuristics rests on underdetermination. 
Consider the set of all heuristics and beliefs that could plausibly be innate. 
For example, certain beliefs about how to produce a grammatical sentence 
are plausibly innate, but beliefs about phlogiston or black holes are not. 
Add to this set all the actual beliefs that could be plausibly held to be 
observational. This set of innate and observational beliefs underdetermines 
the conjectures scientists produce; in other words, the actual conjectures 
which scientists produce are not entailed by this set. Moreover, this set 
also underdetermines the heuristics, in our broad sense of the term, that 
scientists use. Scientific conjectures are much more severely constrained 
than they would be if the innate constraints provided the only restriction. 
It follows that many heuristics are not innate. 
Another rela ted rea on why ii. seem. likely th l th re are acquired 
heuri.<;lic · i th at o many heurL lie · are fi kl specific, like the concrete 
heuristi s and the exemplar· discu. · d above. n suppo · '" that 
I articular hypoth ~. heorie1., or exemplars. a innate o ntailed by lhe 
data, nd Lite ·e are also heuristics. imila.rly, inc th ·e orts o h uri tics 
hange over time with"n a single 1eld, they re almost cenainly not innate. 
O u b~liefs and l:ieurisLics change much more rapidly than do our •ene . 
Thoma, Kuhn' naly is of the role of exemplars in ·cience mak a 
particularly vi "d ~~e for the claim that many heurisli re I on bl.ind 
variation (' uhn 1970. passim). According lo him, n w exemplars are 
generated when a scientific discipline goes into a protracted period of 
crisis. If the old exemplars cannot be made to work, some scientists will 
begju to search for replacem nt ', a carch whi.ch may culminate i.rt ;1 
scientific revolution. But insofar as it is exemplars that guide scientists, and 
new exemplars can only be discovered by suspending the old ones, the 
search for new exemplars must be largely unguided. 12 Moreover, should 
the search be successful, this unmethodical mechanism will be hidden 
from view. After a revolution, much old research is re-presented as 
flowing from the new exemplars, a practice that gives the illusion of 
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cumulative scientific history based on fixed heuristics and so hides the 
chaotic source of the current exemplars. In short, new exemplars must rest 
on hidden chaos. 
Having explained how the guidedness of epistemic variation is explained 
by hidden chaos and epistemic preadaptation as well as some innate 
heuristics, we will now step back and consider the strength of the analogy 
between biological and epistemic evolution. We have already extensively 
discussed the extent to which both involve the blind variation and selective 
retention mechanism - this is the most central feature of the analogy. We 
have also discussed the analogous anomalies that appear in biological and 
epistemic evolution. Biological variation cannot offer a good explanation 
of complex organs because the chances of strictly random mutations 
producing such apparent fit are so small. Similarly, epistemic variation 
cannot offer a good explanation of complex theories because the chances 
of strictly hidden chaos producing such apparent fit are also quite small. 
Further, we have seen that biological and epistemic evolution can solve 
their respective anomalies by appealing to preadaptation. In the biological 
case, a complex organ evolves from an earlier structure that was itself 
adaptive; in the epistemic case, a complex conjecture evolves from an 
earlier conjecture which we call a heuristic. In both cases, an infinite 
regress is avoided because the preadaptations are ultimately based on 
some truly random occurrence: in the biological case, a mutation was 
behind the preadapted structure and in the epistemic case, hidden chaos 
was behind the preadapted heuristic. Note that in both cases, the chaos is 
doubly hidden - it is hidden originally through the hidden chaos, such as 
that of the touting pyramid phenomenon, and then it is further hidden by 
the levels of preadaptation. 
The similarity of biological preadaptation and epistemic preadaptation 
is underscored by our discussion of exemplars. Exemplars can be thought 
of as old solutions grafted onto new problems. In this way, they are much 
like biological preadaptations - old organs, which perform a function in 
the old environment, are used for another task in the new environment. 
In addition, exemplars determine what problems a scientist will tackle 
(namely those which are similar to the exemplar problems) in a way very 
much like the way a pre-organ structure restricts the sort of final organ an 
organism will have. 
An additional feature of the analogy is that both types of preadapta-
tions can be viewed in two, quite compatible, ways: either as restrictions 
on future variations or as programs for the generation of new variations. 
In both the biological and the epistemic cases, preadaptations restrict 
variation, but they also make certain variations possible. In biological 
evolution, the appearance of the half-wing makes possible the appearance 
of some structures, most notably a wing. At the same time, the appearance 
of the half-wing prevents certain other structures from appearing - for 
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example, an arm in place of the half-wing. In epistemic evolution, if a 
person adopts a certain heuristic, then various future conjectures are made 
possible, but others are made impossible or overwhelmingly unlikely. 
One possible disanalogy between biological and epistemic variation that 
seems to have appeared can be turned into another analogous feature 
between the two. In biological evolution, all adaptations are ultimately 
based on strictly random mutations. In contrast, in epistemic evolution, 
some (though if our argument above is correct, relatively few) of the 
preadaptations are innate. The possibility of innate heuristics seems to 
create a disanalogy, since there does not on the surface seem to be a 
biological correlate to an innate epistemic preadaptation. This disanalogy 
dissolves if we recall that a heuristic is anything that guides the production 
of future theories. Carrying this view of preadaptation back to biology, we 
see that just as there may be certain innate heuristics that act to guide 
epistemic variation, there are also innate restrictions on biological varia-
tion, what we call genetic heuristics. The notion of genetic heuristics can 
be seen in two ways, depending on whether we look at phenotypic 
variation or genotypic variation. If we look at genotypic variation, we see 
that the structure of genes and DNA act as genetic heuristics. Certain 
biological variations are precluded because genetic strnctures act to 
restrict variation. If we look at phenotypic variation, we see that genetic 
heuristics preclude certain variations because they are fatal. Certain 
mutations, such as those which would lead to the absence of a heart in a 
mammal, are eliminated before the organism comes into being and so 
cannot show up as phenotypic variations. These genetic heuristics at the 
level of phenotypic variation restrict biological variation as well. In parallel 
to our broad definition of epistemic heuristics, genetic heuristics are the 
restrictions on biological variation. Following this line, we might say that 
biological evolution is built on some genetic heuristics which are, for 
example, chemical in nature. In other words, certain chemical structures 
need to evolve before biological evolution can begin. Thus, the disanalogy 
becomes an analogy: the innate heuristics in epistemic evolution are 
likened to genetic heuristics in biological evolution. 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
We will now go on to consider various objections to the explanation of the 
apparent guidedness of epistemic variation and to the strength of the 
analogy between biological and epistemic variation. Michael Ruse has 
argued that by attributing the guidedness of epistemic variations to 
epistemic preadaptation, evolutionary epistemology improperly locates the 
analogy in such a way that it breaks down. Ruse says that even if the 
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appeal to epistemic preadaptation were correct, evolutionary epistemology 
would "locate the supposedly Darwinian element in science at the wrong 
point to save the organism/ science analogy, as it is usually conceived" 
(Ruse 1986, p. 59). More specifically, this objection sees evolutionary 
epistemology as arguing for a relation between biological and scientific 
entities, that is, beliefs about the world, or first-order beliefs. The move to 
epistemic preadaptation changes part of the relation to one between 
biological entities and heuristics, namely beliefs about beliefs or second-
order beliefs. 
This objection, we think, rests on an overly restrictive view of evolu-
tionary epistemology as well as on a fuzzy distinction between first-order 
and "nth-order" beliefs. First, there is no reason for evolutionary epistem-
ology to focus only on the relation between biological entities and 
first-order beliefs. Rather, evolutionary epistemology should be viewed as 
positing a relation between biological entities and beliefs at all levels (that 
is, first-order beliefs, second-order beliefs, etc.). On this view of evolu-
tionary epistemology, the appeal to epistemic preadaptation does not 
locate the relation at the wrong level. Second, and we think more 
strikingly, there is no clear-cut distinction between first-order and second-
order (or nth-order) beliefs. As Ruse (1986 , p. 59) describes it, evolu-
tionary epistemology deals with particular scientific discoveries, such as 
Watson and Crick's model of DNA. Ruse argues that if we locate the 
analogy at the level of heuristics used by Watson and Crick, rather than at 
the level of their particular discovery, then we are improperly locating the 
analogy at the level of second-order beliefs. However, discoveries made by 
cognitive psychologists are beliefs about beliefs (second-order beliefs), and 
it seems that, in this case, Ruse would want the analogy to be located at 
the second level since it is at this level that the discoveries of cognitive 
psychologists are made. The point is that even if we accept Ruse's 
suggestion to locate the analogy at the point of discovery, we are left with 
an open question as to which level of belief the analogy applies. Further, 
to return to two of the specific examples of discovery heuristics which we 
discussed above, both concrete heuristics and exemplars are instances of 
first-order beliefs that act as heuristics by restricting further epistemic 
variation. 
Ruse, however, has a simple response. Rather than making a distinction 
by talking about levels of beliefs, he can do so by distinguishing between 
the subject of inquiry and the method of inquiry. Ruse could argue that 
evolutionary epistemology, through the move to epistemic preadaptation, 
places the analogy at the wrong place. Rather than locating epistemic 
variation at the subject of inquiry and comparing it to biological variation, 
by making the move to epistemic preadaptation, evolutionary epistemology 
locates epistemic variation at the level of both the subject and the method 
of inquiry. The adjusted version of Ruse's argument is as follows: 
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1. Variation in biology takes place at the level of genetic mutation. 
2. Evolutionary epistemology, in order to explain the seeming guided-
ness of epistemic evolution, needs to make the appeal to epistemic 
preadaptation. 
3. The appeal to epistemic preadaptation locates epistemic variation at 
two levels: at the subject of inquiry and at the method of inquiry. 
4. From 1 and 3, the analogy between epistemic and biological 
evolution breaks down because biological and epistemic variation 
are different. 
We think this argument fails ; it turns on dividing beliefs into two classes 
(first& rder and nth~order), while leaving biology t1ndivided. However, it is 
certainly possible to divide up biological variants in a manner similar to 
the way Ruse divides epistemic variants. We could talk of two classes of 
genes: regulator genes (that is, genes that affect other genes) and non-
regulator genes (that is, all other genes . Th' divi. ion parallel. the divi i n 
between the subj ct of inquiry and the mctl od of inquiry - in oLher 
words the distinction between belie. and belief a.hour bdie · . Thus we 
could say that biofogica •voluli n aLm locales the variation al wo level 
and th . • nalogy L preserved . If • nd ho we di vidc biol ogi ca1 and 
epi ·temic enlili, ·· dep nd on or subjective vi ,wpoint that i il de end~ 
on how we want lo lo k al 1he matter. lt ·eem t:hal no philosophical 
mileage c.an b gotten rom th.is ·ort of distinclfon. 
Lel u illustrate tht point more clearly wi.t11 another hypothetical 
example-. Suppose I have l · t my ke . . he firsl place thal l would look for 
th m would. be my co l pocket~ lh search i not a random ne. Rath r, 
my . earch i guid d by the heuristic H 1 which says: when l J.o e my keys, 
it i high.ly likely th a1 left them in my oat pockel. Howev , 1 H1 re lly a 
heuri ·tic or i it just a belief (a belief ab · ul my forgelful habit. 7 H 1, in 
fact, i based on another hcurislic, H i: when I lo . omeLhing, ii will 
probably be found in the place Lhat I ft n leave it Hi is ulcimately ba.:ed 
on the inductive heuristic Hi: pa l experience is a g1.1ide. to fature 
ex:perienc . Where hould we locate rh • analogy in thi cas '? H2 seem · to 
be both a b lief about the world and a heuri tic, ·ince it guides lhe 
var.iation thal produc H 1, 
Another response to our adjusted version of Ruse's argument would be 
to attack premise 1 directly. Saying that variation in biology only takes 
place at the level of g netic mutaLion is 10 ignor~ the fact llrnl there xist 
genetic heuristics, innate restrictions on biological variation. Genetic 
heuristics such as chemical preadaptations, for example, limit biological 
variation. The existence of heuristics at levels other than biological 
mutations is in direct opposjtion to premise 1. Th se geneli heuristic 
parallel the innate heuristics of epistemic variation and thus save the 
analogy. Thus, Ruse's argument, even if revised to make it stronger, does 
not eem t< do any damag lo the appeal l epist mi preadaptat ori. 
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Peter Skagestad argues that while the move to epistemic preadaptation 
may save the notion of the blindness of epistemic variation, it does so at 
the cost of undermining the central analogy of evolutionary epistemology. 
He argues that epistemic preadaptation " ... may well act in a manner 
diametrically opposite to biological preadaptation" (Skagestad 1978, p. 
615). He claims that a biological preadaptation increases the likelihood of 
further adaptations, while an epistemic preadaptation often decreases the 
likelihood of further adaptations by either leading its possessor to a 
conceptual dead end or by getting its possessor stuck in a rut. 
This objection, we think, is based on a misunderstanding of both 
biological and epistemic preadaptation. Recall how preadaptation is used 
by biologists to explain, for example, how an organism develops a wing. 
The biologist's answer involves the existence of a pre-wing structure, a 
half-wing, which had some preadaptive function. The move to biological 
preadaptation explains how a complex organ evolved. Evolutionary episte-
mologists use the move to epistemic preadaptation to explain the seeming 
guidedness of actions that they want to claim are the result of blind 
variation. Like the biologically preadapted structure, the epistemically 
preadapted heuristic had to have been good for something before its 
current adaptive use. 
Skagestad's objection is that a biological preadaptation increases the 
possibilities of adaptation, while an epistemic preadaptation reduces them. 
We think he is wrong in both cases. As we have already noted, both sorts 
of preadaptations create the potential for new adaptations as well as 
eliminating some of the previously existing potential for adaptations. For 
example, when birds developed half-wings, the possibility of evolving 
wings (and thus the possibility of flying) developed, but, the possibility of 
using the structure that preceded the half-wing (the quarter-wing?) for 
something else, say for picking up small sticks, disappeared (at least for 
the moment - the quarter-wing may reappear, though the chances of this 
are infinitely small). The same is true of epistemic preadaptations: when a 
scientist develops a certain heuristic, a set of possible discoveries that are 
based on that heuristic becomes available, but another set of previously 
possible discoveries is ruled out in light of the heuristic. There are dead 
end mutations in biology which sometimes get selected Gust as there are 
heuristics which rule out good discoveries); we just do not usually call 
them failed preadaptations. In other words, while biological preadaptation 
suggests that the earlier organ enables variation, the presence of that organ 
just as surely restricts variation. This is particularly vivid when we 
consider animals that simply become extinct in a situation where different 
animals would probably have been able to evolve to meet the situation. 
The animals with the "right" preadaptations can adapt, while those with 
the "wrong" preadaptations die. Whatever we choose to call them, it is 
clear that in both biological and epistemic evolution there are variations 
which are selected but that are not ultimately adaptive. Although we have 
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mphasized th i.r re. triclive id • h uristics do make certain conjectures 
more likely. By eliminating some alternatives, heuristics have the effect of 
making the probability of other conjectures. In this way, heuristics, like 
biological preadaptations, both eliminate an<l create possible variations. 
Thus, biological and epistemic preadaptation act in the same manner and 
the analogy is preserved. 
Paul hagard ( 19 , pp. l - J 90) an I William B ln I ( 1984, p. 
316) argue that while biologkal variation a.ri ·e truly independently of 
th ir envirnntneni, epi temic varia tions do nol. A ' Mi b el Brndie writ , 
" . .• conjectur s and theori. , alth ugh Lhey may be blind with r•e ·pect to 
their potential succ ·s ar nc l randomly generated with cspect to the 
nc cl of knowen; but are d veloped in. ce. ponse I a pro lematic environ-
ment" Bradie 19 6. p. 424). In other rds, wi th epistemj variation1 the 
source of the apparent d sign i· environmental pres. ures; lhe data we 
have een up l now influ nee our next conjecture. This difference 
ben eeo biological and epis temic volution has been conceded by at :l ea. l 
one evolutionary epi tem logi~t. Sl -ven Toulmin (197. • 37) ha 
argued that thi disan logy i • explained by the fact that in pi temic 
volulion vari.ttion and ·election ar coupled that i lhat 1-h . lection 
fact r influer ce the ctors that cau··e the variation. whil biological 
va iation and election ar completely uncoupled in the occurrence of 
-enetic muta ion is una ected by lhe environm nt. 
oulmin does not . ee hi aban lonmenL of triclly blind variation for 
variation guided by a coupled r lati n hip wi_th . election a destroying th 
analogy betwe u epi. temi aod biological evolution, because it preserves 
both epistemic and biological variation and selection. L. J. Cohen (1973, 
p. 48; 1974, p. 324) has argued that this is not enough; an evolutionary 
epistemology with coupled variation and selection is not a true evolu-
tionary epistemology. We agree with Cohen in thinking that Toulmin 
drops uncoupled variation and selection far too quickly. At least as far 
back as William James, who expressed "no hesi tation whatever in holding 
firm to the Darwinian distinction [of the uncoupledness of variation and 
selection]" (James 1880, p. 456) even with respect to what he called 
mental progress, people have denied that epistemic variations are influ-
enced by their environment. James writes: 
I can e.asdly show that throughou1 the wllole ex tent or tbose mental departments whkh 
re higlte I ••• the new 4.-oncep!lons, emotions llilcl active tcudcmde.:, whlcb evol e 1:1re 
origmally produced n the &hapc of r.mdom images, fandes, accidental oulbi.rth of 
spmnaneou variation in tlie funclion a livhy of lhc exc.cssiveJy un.stal>lc human brain, 
which the uulcr eoviroomeul simply confinns or re uies, dopts or rejects, preservi:s or 
destroy - e,lccls in short, ju t as it selects morphological and ocl!,I varialion d11c to 
molecular ac-cidc:nts of an anal.o,gou ort . (Jarne& 1 &80, p. 446) 
In fact, on our definition of heuristics, the coupling problem is nothing 
new. To see this, let us return for a moment to our discussion of heuristics 
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and preadaptation. The appeal to epistemic preadaptation was made in 
order to explain the apparent guidedness of epistemic variation. The 
heuristics gained through preadaptation are just restrictions on variation: 
the more specific the heuristic, the more restricted the variation. Viewed 
in this way, the problem which coupling is meant to answer can be 
answered by the appeal to epistemic preadaptation. The data (the environ-
ment) influence the next conjecture (future variations); we do not need the 
coupling of variation and selection to explain this. Data influence the 
heuristics, which, in turn, restrict subsequent variation. This is the same in 
biology where the environment influences preadaptations, which, in turn, 
restrict future variations. 
One further objection, made by both Thagard (1980, p. 190) and 
David Hull (1982, p. 307) is that the agents involved in epistemic 
variation want to solve a problem or accomplish a goal while the agents of 
biological selection want no such things. Even if the desire of epistemic 
agents does not guide variation, the mere fact that there is this desire 
seems to create a disanalogy: a scientist wants to solve a problem, even if 
her wants do not restrict variation. This is very different in biological 
evolution, where the members of the evolving species do not generally 
have any desires at all. As Thagard says, "The relevant difference between 
genes and theories is that theories have people trying to make them 
better" (Thagard 1980, p. 190). Because epistemic variation involves 
intentions, while biological variation does not, the analogy seems to break 
down. 
Our response to this objection again involves the notion of the epistemic 
preadaptation of heuristics. Does the fact that epistemic variation involves 
intentions actually affect variation in any substantive way? If it has no 
effect, then it does not cause a disanalogy. If it has an effect, the only 
effect it could have is to restrict variation, in which case intentions can be 
thought of as heuristics, for heuristics are nothing except restrictions on 
variation. However, if these features can be thought of as heuristics , then 
they can be explained as preadaptations. In the face of all of these 
objections, we think that our resolution of the anomaly of guided variation 
survives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This essay was motivated by the claim that there is a fundamental 
disanalogy between biological and epistemic evolution: biological variation 
is blind, while epistemic evolution is not. The problems an organism faces 
do not influence the new genotypes that will occur, but the problems 
a scientist faces seem obviously to influence the hypotheses she will 
propose. We have argued that this objection to evolutionary epistemology 
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i · mi. guided., ome ep' ·temi • va i tion i unguided: ·ome of a r candidate 
hypot.bese are in fac t produced quite blindly, Lh ugh thi · chaos is lau r 
hidden for a vari ty of rea ons. [n th r (;a e , epislemic variation i. 
restrict · I, bu t by a m~chani ·m lh· i analogo 1,.1-ti lo biological preadapta-
tion. In biotogi.c I ev lulion, comple organs evolv fr m ther organ . 
Th c, rlier preadap ta tiofl! 1nake complex organs po ·sible. They a l 
effectively rest l'i I biological variation, ince Lhe i .rm 1hat a comple · 
org n can 1ak is trordy influenced by tit part.ict!lar pre-adapialions 
availabl , irnilarly, we have argued hat , ·pi tern.i _ varia tion L ten 
r uicted by preoadaptaJions in rhe form of heuri Lie , and we ha e 
uggested what some these heuril tics are like. W ha , gone on to 
discus. the s urce of the. beuri. ti and have rgued that, ~ bile orne of 
1hem al'e presumabl innate and o beyond lbe ken f proper y con-
stJued evoluti,onary epi tern log,)', mo. t of them a.re ultimat ly ba.5ed on 
blind variarion; lha1 ··, they are h uri. Li ·• reUlined fr in pre: iou · variation. 
Danvln s theor explain the urpri!.ing fit between organi m anr.J 
· virnnment in term$ of hidden randomness and lS lectiw reten tion; 
ev lution~ ry episl m I gy u ' the same ort of m chani. m to e plain lh 
surpri.,ing fi t betwe n belief · and the world. ln both ca e; w adlicv an 
elegant and deep xpl_nation of the ay orde c n a.ri. e out. of chao .. In 
both ·ase ; we mw \ also face the anomaly of apparcntJy guided variati n 
- the pr >blem comple r rgaru in biology and of intelligent conje u re 
in cpistem · logy. What we have argued in this ay is that both an mali~ 
can b · lved by an appeal to preadaptation, th applicati n of pPviou 
adaplali tl · themf)elv he result of chanc and inh ritanc . TI1c model of 
randc_ m va i• lion and sdective retenti n i saved by howiag that what 
ppears lo be non- random variati n i in fac t lhe r · ·ul t of e.lective 
rel nl"on. ome conjeclur • re II arc guided, bu,t th guide are ·imply 
parts of the inh ritance th l is an e . enliaJ eature f the v lutionary 
modet We have thu tlied I av the centra l claim of volutionar 
epistemology w ile al lhe -·ame time prese ving 1.he slrong imuition that 
1.h pmces · by ·hich u ienti. ts gen rate their hypotb · is no l u ·ually a 
random walk. We also hope l have provided some indication of the 
r11.1itfu.ln s of n hin out ~he analogy l:,etween episl•emic anJ biologic.al 
volution, 
NOTES 
* We would like to thank Paul Bloom, Donald Campbell , Philip Clayton, Paul Pietroski, 
Peter Skag~tad, Nicho las Thompson, 0 . L V:mkin, as1.lo Vt'r · nyi :ind 1wo a11ony1m us-
referees for their helpful comments. 
1 Our dJ Hn~tion between olkring a b io logical explanatfon of belief and u~i ng biology , · a 
model for a non-biological explanation parallels Michael Bradie's distinction between the 
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evolution of cognitive mechanisms program (EEM) and the evolution of theories program 
(EET) (Bradie 1986, pp. 403-413). In this terminology, our interest is in EET's. As 
Bradie observes, however, the relationship between these two programs is complex, since 
many of those who pursue the model approach also appeal to biology directly. That 
is, they include some EEM inside their EET. Our version of EET will avoid this 
complication. 
2 The idea that the guidedness of epistemic preadaptations can be explained by something 
analogous to biological preadaptations is discussed by Campbell (1974a, 1974b) and 
Skagestad (1978). 
3 Gould and Lewontin (1978), among others, have extensively criticized what they call the 
adaptationist program. In particular, Gould has argued that 'preadaptation' is a bad word 
for the phenomenon that we use it to refer to because it implies that the new use of the 
structure was in some way anticipated. Instead, Gould recommends the use of the word 
'exaptation'. We will use the more standard 'preadaptation', but it should be read as 
synonymous to Gould's term, i.e., not as implying any foresight. 
4 Setting up this parallel is not to gloss over the differences between pre-Darwinian 
biology and pre-evolutionary epistemology. The pre-Darwinian view believes in perfect fit 
and no variation. The pre-evolutionary epistemology view believes in some variation and 
no blind variation. The pre-evolutionary epistemology view of epistemology is much like a 
sophisticated teleological argument in biology which holds that there is variation, but that 
this variation is guided. 
5 Campbell (1974a) presents a variety of "testimonials" which give accounts of some of 
the ways that the blindness of epistemic variation is hidden. 
6 There is a large literature on this reduction relation between new and old theories. One 
classic discussion is Ernest Nagel (1961), chapter 11. For a criticism of the traditional 
view, see Kuhn (1970) especially chapter IX. Kuhn's stand on incommensurability leads 
him to deny that new theories entail their predecessors as approximations, but he does 
seem to allow for concrete rules. Thus, he says that "[s]ince new paradigms are born from 
old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both con-
ceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously employed" (Kuhn 
1970, p. 149), 
7 Kuhn maintains that those periods of normal science where exemplars serve as heuristics 
are not ones where theories are being tested. This may seem to disqualify exemplars as 
discovery heuristics, since these heuristics are supposed to generate hypotheses to be 
tested. But this may not be a serious problem. First of all, Kuhn has probably exaggerated 
the extent to which the normal scientist accepts her theoretical framework without ques-
tion. More importantly, even if the over-arching theories the scientist uses to solve her 
problems are not up for testing, the particular solutions she proposes certainly are, and 
these solutions are themselves hypotheses. 
8 We use "belief" as a broad term meant to include accepted hypotheses and accepted 
restrictions on epistemic variation; we do not, however, mean to count candidate hypothe-
ses as beliefs. 
9 Peter Skagestad (1978, pp. 615-616) defends such a view which he attributes to 
Charles Sanders Peirce. 
10 Another empirical question is that of those theories not generated by innate heuristics, 
how many are generated by acquired heuristics and how many rest on hidden chaos? 
11 There are presumably possible worlds in which creatures very much like us in all other 
respects have all their heuristics and beliefs genetically hard-wired in them. The arguments 
that follow support our intuitions that this world is not such a world. 
12 It could be that the foundation of new exemplars is guided by some inter-paradigm 
heuristics, but Kuhn's emphasis is rather on the absence of such things. Kuhn's point is that 
if you overthrow the dominant paradigm together with its exemplars, what is left (e.g., 
inductive and deductive logic) radically underdetermines the new paradigm. 
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